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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (d) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether a search occurred when police officers shined a
flashlight into an apartment door left partially open by the
defendant.
Whether the defendant consented to the officers' entry into
her apartment.
If a search and seizure did occur, was it justified by
exigent circumstances?
A trial court's legal conclusions based on factual findings
are reviewed under a nondeferential correction of error standard.
State v. Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
2

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On January 1, 1993 a two-car accident occurred in Orem,
after which one of the cars involved left the scene of the
accident.

Shortly after the accident an Orem police officer

found the car that left the scene, learned where the driver
lived, was joined by another officer, and both officers, after an
encounter with the defendant, entered the driver's apartment
without a search warrant.

The driver subsequently was charged

with two class B misdemeanors: (1) leaving the scene of an
accident, and (2) driving under the influence of alcohol.

The

driver, the defendant in this matter, moved to suppress all
evidence gathered after the officers entered the defendant's
apartment.

The motion to suppress was denied.

The defendant

subsequently was tried for and convicted of both counts as
charged.

The defendant took this appeal, contending the trial

court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts
On January 1, 1993, at about 6:00 p.m., a two-car accident
occurred in Orem, Utah.

(Trial Transcript, p. 4 ) . One of the

cars involved, a full-size brown Buick, left the scene of the
accident.

Id.

Officer Denton Johnston responded to the accident

scene, received a description of the Buick that left the
accident, and, "due to the time delay, the short time delay
3

between the time it was dispatched to me, the time I arrived,"
radioed other units to look for the Buick in the vicinity of the
accident scene.

(Suppression Hearing Transcript p. 11). Officer

Terry Steele, responding to Officer Johnston's radio
transmission, "almost immediately" found at an apartment complex
nearby the accident scene a Buick matching the one which had left
the accident scene.

(Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 13).

Officer Steele approached the Buick and saw "the [car] door was
ajar approximately and inch, and I smelled a very strong odor of
alcohol coming from inside of that vehicle." Id. at 14.

As

Officer Steele approached the fourplex in front of which the
Buick was parked, "I notice the door on the bottom left that had
the lights out was closing slowly."

Id.

Officer Steele went to

an upstairs apartment, learned the owner of the Buick was Kari
Henrie--the defendant in this case--and that Kari lived in the
downstairs apartment whose door was closing slowly.

Id.

Officer

Steele went down to that apartment, and knocked several times on
the outer screen door.

There was no response.

Id. at 15.

Officer Steele then turned to walk back up the stairs and
"noticed a purse laying on the stairs next to the wall by the
door."

Id.

About the same time Officer Steele found the purse,

Sgt. Ned Jackson arrived.

Id.

identification of Kari Henrie.

The purse contained the
Id. at 16.

Officer Steele told

Sgt. Jackson about the door closing slowly and the two officers
returned to the defendant's door to knock again.

Id.

Sgt.

Jackson reached through the screen door, either because there was
4

no screen there or because it was "ripped out" and "knocked real
hard on the wood door to see if we would get a response, and the
door opened approximately 18, 20 inches."

Id.

The wood door

opened the officers noticed keys in the door handle.

Id.

The

officers did not know the keys were in the door prior to Sgt.
Jackson's knocking.

Id.

The only indication the officers knew

the door was ajar before Sgt. Jackson knocked is the trial
court's suggestion.1 Id. at 23.
"pitch black."

Id. at 17.

The apartment interior was

(At this point in the narrative,

there are differences between the officers' recollections of what
happened at the door.

The trial court did not make formal

findings of fact on this question.)

Officer Steele's

recollection is that once the door opened, Officer Steele shone
his flashlight into the apartment, believing a person was in the
apartment, not knowing whether or not that person was injured,
and while recalling the smell of alcohol coming from the Buick.
Id.

Sgt. Jackson's recollection is that once the door opened,

Officer Steele pushed the door open "a little further" (id. at
26), "maybe another foot or so" (id. at 29) and, leither
simultaneously or immediately subsequent to pushing the door
further, shone his flashlight into the apartment.

1

(At this point

After the door opened, it became evident the door was ajar.
The trial court's suggestion that the door was ajar, and Officer
Steele's acknowledgement that an ajar door was knocked on, probably
is an after-the-fact deduction made by both the trial court and
Officer Steele. There is no suggestion Sgt. Jackson's knock was an
effort to open the door. The defendant seems to agree that the
door opening as a result of Sgt. Jackson's knock was not a search.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 31; Appellant's Brief, p.5)
5

in the narrative, the officers' recollections converge and are
materially the same.)

Officer Steele's flashlight illuminated

"somebody in a back room sitting on a bed."
Transcript, p. 17)

(Suppression Hearing

Officer Steele called out "Kari," and Kari

stood up and said, "Yes."

Id.

Officer Steele said, "Can we talk

to you?" or "We need to talk to you."
"Okay," or "Yeah," Id. at 17, 21.

Id.

Kari's response was

Immediately subsequent to

giving that response Kari began a staggered walk toward the door,
possibly detouring for a moment into another room.
22, 27.

Id. at 17,

Both officers entered the apartment when Kari began

walking toward the door, after she said "Yeah" or "Okay." Id. at
17.

Officer Steele stated his motivation for entering the

apartment was related to perceiving Kari's stagger.
22.

Id. at 21-

Sgt. Jackson's testimony is: "We moved in a little further"

when the officers perceived the staggering, (id. at 27) possibly
implying the officers already were inside the apartment when they
first perceived the staggering.

Sgt. Jackson's testimony, taken

in context, indicates the officers entered when Kari began
walking toward the officers at the door.

Id. at 26-27.

At that

point the officers invited the defendant outside to discuss a car
accident and subsequently gathered evidence leading to her
convictions for leaving the scene of an accident and driving
under the influence of alcohol.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The officers at the defendant's front door were in a place
constituting a lawful vantage point.

The fortuitousness of the

door opening as a consequence of Sgt. Jackson's act of knocking
on a door that he did not know was ajar did not affect the
lawfulness of the officers' vantage point.
swinging open was not a search.2

The door consequently

Officer Steele's subsequent

illumination of the apartment with his flashlight was not a
search because the defendant was in "open view" or "plain sight"
from a lawful vantage point.

The subsequent conversation between

the defendant and Officer Steele constituted consent to entry of
the apartment.

Consequently, the trial court was correct in

denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered as a
result of the officers' entry into the apartment.
If this court rules that Officer Steele's illuminating the
apartment was a protected search, or if this court rules that the
officers' entry was non-consensual, the search must be
scrutinized under an exigent circumstances analysis.

Under that

analysis, entry was permissible because the officers had probable
cause to believe the defendant had committed two misdemeanor

2

If this court finds from the record that Officer Steele
pushed the door open further after Sgt. Jackson's knocking opened
the door but before Officer Steele shone his flashlight, the City
abandons this point, because it concedes that if Officer Steele
indeed pushed open the door further before initiating a
conversation with the defendant, such conduct is an entry. The
City's argument here is based on Officer Steele's testimony. If
this court believes this factual finding dispositive, the City
requests this case be remanded to the trial court for findings on
the issue.
7

crimes and because exigent circumstances existed.

ARGUMENT NO. I
POINT I
THE OFFICERS' POSITION AT THE DEFENDANT'S
APARTMENT DOOR WAS A LAWFUL VANTAGE POINT.
In State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that places where a government official has
a right to be include "the entrance of a home, front doors, and
other open areas accessible to the public at large . . . . "

Id.

The court in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981), stated:
"The open pathway to the front door [is] an implied invitation to
members of the public to enter thereon."

Id.

The police were

within their rights to be in the common area open to the public
in front of the defendant's apartment door.

POINT II
WHAT A POLICE OFFICER SEES FROM A LAWFUL
VANTAGE POINT IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF AN
UNLAWFUL SEARCH.
"For an officer to look at what is in open view from a
position open to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a
reasonable expectation of privacy."
51 (Utah 1981).

State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48,

The court in Lee noted an important point

regarding the distinction between use "open view" or "plain
sight" and "plain view", which is applicable in this matter:
"Plain view" is the term uniformly given to the doctrine
invoked for seizing evidence without a warrant at the time
of an arrest. [citations omitted] We use the term "open
8

view" or "plain sight" to describe the applicable concept in
the instant case and distinguish it from the "plain view"
doctrine. [citations omitted] The confusion engendered by
use of the same term for different concepts is illustrated
by the dissenting opinion's application of the requirement
that the incriminating nature of the evidence must be
immediately apparent. That is a requirement that must be
met to justify a warrantless seizure incident to arrest
[citation omitted] under the "plain view" doctrine.
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48.

The New Mexico Court of Appeals also

has clearly described this distinction in State v. CalvillO/ 792
P.2d 1157, 1160 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), wherein it stated:
The plain view rule has two meanings. First, and most
commonly, the term describes a seizure of evidence
inadvertently discovered in the course of an intrusion
for which there was prior justification, such as a
search warrant. The second plain view rule applies
when no fourth amendment search has occurred at all.
It applies in those instances where an observation is
made by an officer without a prior physical intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area. The mere
looking at that which is open to view is not a search.
We believe this second type of plain view rule applies
in the present case.
Id. , (citations omitted) .

Of the two rules described, the one

applicable in Lee and in the instant matter is the one where no
search or seizure occurs prior to the time the officer first
observes the object which, subsequent to the officer's open view
observation, becomes the subject of a search or seizure.
The relevance of this is that the City in this point of
argument is seeking only to defeat the defendant's claim that
Officer Steele's shining of his flashlight into an open apartment
door was a search.

The City does not think this was a search,

based on Lee and the authorities discussed below.

If this court

finds the City's argument on this point persuasive, the City
still must show the defendant consented to the officers' entry.

9

By simply standing at the door, the officers did not perform
a search.

By continuing to stand at the front door once it swung

open, the officers did not perform a search because they were
still at their original lawful vantage point and did nothing
intentionally to enlarge their vantage point.

See Calvillo, 792

P.2d at 1160 ("The fourth amendment has never been extended to
required law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.11) .

Therefore, up to

the point when Officer Steele shone his flashlight into the
darkened apartment, no search had occurred.
The defendant apparently agrees that the door opening as a
result of Sgt. Jackson's knock was not a search.

(Suppression

Hearing Transcript, p. 31/ Appellant's Brief, p. 5 ) . The
defendant argues, however, that Officer Steele's use of his
flashlight to illuminate the apartment once the door was open
constituted a search, requiring suppression of evidence gathered
thereafter.

For the reasons discussed below, the City disagrees.

POINT III
OFFICER STEELE'S ACT OF SHINING HIS
FLASHLIGHT INTO THE APARTMENT WAS NOT A
SEARCH.
Case law supports the position that a police officer's
shining of a flashlight into a dwelling or hotel room from a
lawful vantage point is not an improper search.

State v.

Calvillo, 792 P.2d 1157 (N.M. App. 1990), concluded that a police
officer shining his flashlight through a window into a house at
10

night to illuminate an object was not a search, where the
object—a gun—could have been viewed without a flashlight, and
where the officer was in a common area when he shone his
flashlight.
While Calvillo ultimately was decided on exigent
circumstances grounds, the court there reached a subsidiary
conclusion that the "officers' actions did not constitute a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, inasmuch as
the gun was in plain view" from a place where the officers had a
right to be.

Id. at 1160.

The Calvillo court also observed that the defendant, in his
position inside his house but in a place observable from the
common driveway, had a lesser expectation of privacy: "The
officers looked into the window just as defendant's neighbors
could have from the same vantage point."

Id.

The obvious

distinction between Calvillo's facts and those in the instant
matter is that in the instant matter the defendant's apartment
was completely dark, and Officer Steele needed a flashlight to
see the defendant at all.

It should be further noted that the

Calvillo court used as supporting authority a case where
contraband was visible and binoculars were used to confirm the
presence of contraband, indicating that court's analysis
scrutinized and was directly applicable to situations where
officers have a relatively certain identification of contraband
before using flashlights or binoculars for confirmation.
Calvillo, 792 P.2d at 1160.
11

In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 777 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1989),
officers having a lawful vantage point shone a flashlight through
a partially open motel room door left open by the defendant,
observed contraband, subsequently arrested the defendant who was
in the hallway outside the motel room, obtained a warrant to
enter the motel room, and seized the contraband.

The defendant

contended the officers use of a flashlight was a search.
The court disagreed, specifically holding
that one who asserts that his rights have been violated by
an unreasonable search accomplished by looking through a
motel room window or door must show that he took precautions
sufficient to create an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy. Otherwise, that which was seen was in plain
view.
Johnson, 777 S.W.2d at 876.
The court concluded that the defendant, by leaving his motel
door partially open to public view, deprived himself of a
reasonable expectation of privacy and in the same sentence
discounted the significance of the use of a flashlight:
Having concluded that appellant's act of leaving his motel
room door and window partially 'open to public view deprived
him of a reasonable expectation of privacy, of what
significance then is the police officer's use of a
flashlight to look inside? One seeking to maintain his
privacy should reasonably expect persons disposed to look
inside a hotel room will not hesitate to enhance their
visibility by use of a widely available device such as a
flashlight.
Id. at 878-79/ see also, State v. Lange, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1990) (while there must be limits to the degree government
can be permitted to intrude upon a person's home, use of standard
equipment like binoculars does not violate fourth amendment).
In the instant matter, the defendant by leaving her
12

apartment door slightly ajar deprived herself of a reasonable
expectation of privacy: she could have expected anybody—members
of the public or the police—approaching the common area in front
of her door for the purpose of contacting her to knock on the
door and, by so knocking, open it unintentionally.
The Johnson court stated that existing lighting conditions
or time of day should not affect whether or not contraband is in
plain view:
We are now of the opinion that a determination of whether or
not contraband is in plain view should not depend on
existing lighting conditions or time of day.
Id. at 879, citing Texas v. Brown# 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983)

("...

the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply
does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth
Amendment protection.").
The court did note that "what would be sufficient vigilance
to preserve one's privacy in a home, apartment of office may be
insufficient in a motel room."

Id. at 878.

The view that lighting conditions should not affect a
determination whether an object is in open view is consistent
with the Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
48, 51 (Utah 1981), a case involving search of a camper through
its window, wherein the court stated:
For an officer to look at what is in open view from a
position lawfully accessible to the public cannot constitute
an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. ...
Furthermore, the use of a flashlight to assist the natural
vision at night does not make an "observation" a "search."
Id.
13

The obvious distinction between Calvillo and Johnson and the
instant matter is that the officers in those two cases
encountered pre-existing conditions; in the instant matter the
officers unintentionally created the circumstance giving them the
open view by knocking on a door they did not know was ajar.
Notwithstanding this distinction, the City maintains its position
that by leaving the door ajar, the defendant deprived herself of
a reasonable expectation of privacy from any person attempting to
contact her by knocking on her door.
The rationale of Lee, Calvillo, and Johnson supports the
position that where an officer occupies a lawful vantage point
and observes from that vantage point an object or person in open
view, that object or person is not the subject of an unlawful
search, whether or not the officer uses a flashlight to alter
lighting conditions, even where the person is located in a
residence.

The City requests this court to so hold.

The foregoing case law does not directly support the above
position in cases where officers unintentionally enlarge the open
view their vantage point provides.

But where the officers did

nothing intrusive, unreasonable or intentional to enlarge their
open view, such a conclusion is logical.

This conclusion is

further supported where a defendant has deprived herself of or at
least diminished her reasonable expectation of privacy by her own
act of leaving a door ajar.
Since no unlawful search occurred when Officer Steele used
his flashlight to illuminate the apartment, evidence gathered
14

after that point need not be suppressed, if the officers had
consent to enter the apartment.

POINT IV
THE DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE
OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS ENTRY.
When Officer Steele saw the defendant stand up, he engaged
her in a brief conversation and encounter which constituted
voluntary consent to entry.

The analysis of whether the consent

exception to the warrant requirement applies to specific
circumstances necessarily is a two-step analysis.

The City bears

burden of showing (1) consent was given, and (2) such consent was
voluntary.
While this court has addressed how to determine whether
consent was voluntary in State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992), Utah appellate courts apparently have not addressed
how to determine whether or not consent was given at all.
In People v. Henderson, 568 N.E.2d 1234 (111. 1990), the
Illinois Supreme Court promulgated a standard requiring that the
circumstances leading to entry of a home must be such that the
police reasonably could have believed they had been given consent
to enter:
We now hold that, when a court is deciding whether
consent was given (not whether that consent was
voluntary), the circumstances must have been such that
the police could have reasonably believed they had been
given consent to enter. ... This test is consistent
with the fourth amendment proscription against
unreasonable search and seizures.
Id. at 1^54 (citations omitted).
15

"Consent may be explicit, or it may be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances."
398 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).

People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394,

See also, United States v. Tragash,

691 F.Supp. 1066 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (consent to a search may be in
the form of words, gestures or conduct)/ Bradley v. State, 662
P.2d 993 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (consent must unequivocal and
specific).
Under the circumstances of the instant matter, the
defendant's words and conduct gave the officers a reasonable
belief the defendant consented to the officers' entry.

When

Officer Steele called out "Kari," she responded "Yes."

Officer

Steele then' said, "Can we talk to you?" or "We need to talk to
you."

Kari's response was "Okay" or "Yeah."

Immediately

subsequent to those words of assent, Kari began walking to the
door, showing a further willingness to talk with the officers in
addition to her words of assent.

(Suppression Hearing

Transcript, p. 17, 21). Under these circumstances, the officers
had a reasonable belief the defendant gave them consent to enter.
Step two requires a showing that the defendant gave her
consent voluntarily.

This court has stated that it makes this

determination by
lookfing] to the totality of the circumstances to ascertain
whether consent in fact was voluntarily given and not the
result of duress or coercion express or implied. The State
bears the burden of showing the consent was voluntary. We
further look to see if there is clear and positive testimony
that the consent was unequivocal and freely given.
Caster, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted).
The evidence is that the defendant immediately verbally
16

responded in the affirmative to Officer Steele's request to talk
with her.

Officer Steele only called out once, after which the

defendant responded and even walked toward the door to further
engage the officers.

Additionally, there is no evidence of

duress or coercion.
Since the defendant voluntarily consented to the officer's
entry, the evidence of her involvement in a hit and run accident
and in a DUI gathered in her apartment is not the subject of an
unlawful search or seizure and need not be suppressed.

ARGUMENT II
Even if this court finds that Officer Steele's use his
flashlight to illuminate the defendant's apartment, or the
officers' subsequent entry constituted a search and/or seizure,
the entry was permissible because the officers had probable cause
to believe the defendant had committed two misdemeanors and
because exigent circumstances existed.

POINT I
THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE
DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED TWO MISDEMEANOR
CRIMES.
Both probable cause and exigent circumstances must be shown
to validate the officers' entry into the apartment.

State v.

Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Here,

because entry into a home is involved, that burden is
particularly heavy.

State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah
17

Ct. App. 1991).
a.

The police had probable cause to
believe the defendant had committed
the crime of hit and run.

As the defendant acknowledges, the police had probable cause
to believe the defendant had committed the crime of hit and run.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6 ) . Officer Steele found a perfect match,
including license plate identification, of the Buick involved in
the reported accident,
b.

(Suppression Transcript, p. 14).

The police had probable cause to
believe the defendant had committed
the crime of DU1.

The police also had probable cause to believe the defendant
had committed the crime of DUI.

"The test [for probable case] is

whether the facts known to [the officer], and the fair inferences
[to be drawn] therefrom, would justify a reasonable and prudent
person in his position in believing that appellant had committed
the offense."

State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah Ct.

App. 1991) .
Under this standard, the officers had probable cause that
the defendant had committed the crime of DUI.
following information.

They had the

Th6 Buick was parked unusually: "The

right front tire was against the curb.

The right rear tire was

back a ways, probably a foot, foot and a half away from the curb.
I noticed it was parked kind of funny."

(Suppression Transcript,

p. 13). The door was ajar approximately an inch.

Id. at 14.

"very strong" odor of alcohol emanated from the vehicle, which
odor Officer Steele remembered when he stood at the door the
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A

second time.

Id. at 14, 17.

The defendant's apartment door was

closing slowly as Officer Steele arrived.

Id. at 15.

The

defendant did not respond to Officer Steele's knocks on the
screen door, indicating perhaps she had something to hide.

Id.

The defendant's purse lay on the common area near the door to her
apartment, indicating the kind of inadvertence associated with
intoxication. Id.

The defendant's keys were in the door of her

apartment, indicating further inadvertence.

Id. at 16.

When the

defendant did respond, she staggered as she walked, which was
observed prior to the officer's entry.

Id. at 22, 27.

With the

exception of the strong odor of alcohol and possibly the unusual
parking position of the defendant's car, most of these facts,
including the fact of the accident itself, indicate a person
fleeing.

Fleeing an a auto accident scene tends to suggest the

driver had been drinking, "intoxication being a common reason
people flee accidents."
(Minn. 1988).

State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60

Further, the fact of the accident itself indicates

inattentive driving, "the sort of inattention that often is
explained by the defendant's being under the influence of
alcohol."

Id.

Under these facts known to the officers, and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, the officers were justified in
believing the defendant had committed the crime of DUI.

Indeed,

to suggest the opposite based on these facts, known to trained
officers, is untenable.
In addition to probable cause, exigent circumstances were
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required for the officers to enter the defendant's apartment.

POINT II
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED WHEN THE
OFFICERS ENTERED THE DEFENDANT'S APARTMENT.
This court recently described the exigent circumstances
doctrine:
Exigent circumstances are those that would cause a
reasonable person to believe that entry was necessary to
prevent physical harm to the officer or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect,
or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate
law enforcement efforts. The need for an immediate search
must be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh
the important protection of individual rights provided by
the warrant requirement. ... The existence of exigent
circumstances must be based on the reasonable belief of the
police officer.
State v. Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 40-41 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

The reviewing court's "task is to review the totality of

the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine
if the finding of exigency was proper."

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d

1255 (Utah 1987) .
In this brief the City only will address the destruction of
evidence exigent circumstance, i.e., dissipation of the
defendant's blood alcohol level or other evidence of
intoxication.

There can be no question that as time passed after

the accident, the defendant's blood alcohol level was declining.
The generally accepted rate at which the human body metabolizes
alcohol is between .015 to .02% per hour, depending on body
weight. See generally, B. Byrne & R. Reece, Trying the DUI Case
in Utah, Appendix 2d (1989); see also, People v. Odenweller, 527
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N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. A.D. 1988) (MERCURE, J., dissenting).

As time

passed from when the defendant had been driving, evidence
literally was being destroyed.

DUI evidence is unique in this

regard in that once alcohol ingestion ceases, evidence of
intoxication steadily is destroyed.
The United States Supreme Court referred to the need to
ascertain a driver's blood alcohol level as an "exigent
circumstance" in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984) .
The dispositive question, therefore, is, given the unique nature
of evidence of intoxication, is the need to gather such evidence
a

sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless home search or

seizure?

For the reasons discussed below, the City believes it

is, especially in circumstances like the instant matter where a
defendant commits a crime—leaving the scene—which prevents law
enforcement from observing gathering evidence at the scene of the
accident.
POINT III
CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE POSITION THAT EVIDENCE
OF INTOXICATION SHOULD BE A RECOGNIZED
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE.
The defendant cites Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984),
for the proposition that the exigency of needing to obtain blood
alcohol levels is insufficient to justify a warrantless home
search and seizure.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 8 ) . The rationale of

Welsh distinguish it from the instant matter and support the
opposite conclusion in the present case.
The rationale in Welsh was based largely on Wisconsin's
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characterization of DUI as a minor offense.

The Court's

statement of the issue was: "whether, and if so under what
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from
making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in order to
arrest him for a nonmailable traffic offense.
742 (emphasis added).

Welsh, 466 U.S. at

Both the majority and concurring opinions

took pains to emphasize the importance to the Court's holding of
Wisconsin's characterization of DUI as a minor offense:
At the time in question, the Vehicle Code provided that a
first offense for [DUJ] was a noncriminal violation subject
to a civil forfeiture proceeding for a maximum fine of $200.
Id. at 746.
The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first
offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal,
civil forfeiture for which no imprisonment is possible.
This is the best indication of the State's interest in
precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily
identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a
decision to arrest. Given this expression of the State's
interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply
because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level
might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant.
Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the
unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up t o —
and do something about—the continuing slaughter upon our
Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is caused by
drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of
alcohol or drug ingestion. ... [I]t is amazing to me that
[Wisconsin] still classifies driving while intoxicated as a
civil violation that allows only a money forfeiture ... so
long as it is a first offense. ... But if Wisconsin and
other States choose by legislation thus to regulate their
penalty structure, there is, unfortunately, nothing in the
United States Constitution that says they may not do so.
Id. at 755-56 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
Of further significance is the court's
22

f,

hold[ing] that an

important factor to be considered when determining whether
exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for
which the arrest is being made."

Id. at 753.

The court did not

have "occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may
impose and absolute ban on warrantless arrests for certain minor
offenses,"

Id, at 749, n. 11. The gravity of the offense is an

important factor for determining whether exigent circumstances
justify a warrantless in-home arrest.

State v. Ramirez/ 814 P.2d

at 1134.
Unlike the State of Wisconsin, Utah is one of those States
whose expression of state interest in its DUI statutory scheme
clearly shows that this State considers DUI a serious offense.
First, DUI in Utah is a criminal offense for which criminal
jeopardy attaches; it is not a civil offense.

Cf., City of Orem

v. Crandall, 760 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Second, Utah's statutory scheme shows that the citizens of
this state consider DUI to be a serious offense:

on arrest for

DUI the driver's vehicle is impounded, Utah Code Ann. § 41-644.30 (1993); DUI is a class B misdemeanor, the punishment for a
first conviction being a mandatory two days in jail and a
possibility of 10 days in jail, id. at § 41-6-44(4) (a);
additionally, a first time conviction requires the defendant to
participate in assessment and education for alcohol dependency
and rehabilitation, id. at 41-6-44(4)(c)(i). This on a first
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conviction.3

The penalties increase for subsequent offenses.

Id.
Welsh indicates that the gravity of the offence
determination for fourth amendment purposes be made by viewing
how seriously a state considers a crime.

Given that Welsh

considered the gravity of the offense in terms of Wisconsin's
interest in the offense of DUI, as shown through its lenient
statutory scheme, this court should view the gravity of DUI in
Utah through Utah's statutory scheme, which makes DUI a serious
offense:
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely
among the States, the penalty that may attach to any offense
seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication
of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected
of committing that offense.
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, n. 14.4
The clear and consistent indication from Utah's statutory
scheme regarding DUI is that Utah considers DUI a serious

3

Because of Wisconsin's statutory scheme, the Court in Welsh
imputed to the investigating officers the assumption that the
defendant there was being investigated for a nonjailable traffic
offense. Because Utah's statutory scheme makes firs-time DUI a
mandatory-jail offense, the officers here should have imputed to
them the assumption that they were investigating a jailable
offense. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 746, n. 6.
4

Here the City respectfully disagrees with this court's
statement that the Court in Welsh characterized "drunk driving as
minor in the context of considering an intrusion into the sanctity
of a home . ..." State v. Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 42, n. 7
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) .
The Court very clearly considered the
seriousness of DUI in terms of Wisconsin's statutory scheme, not
the Court's own perspective: "Nor do we mean to suggest that the
prevention of drunken driving is not properly of major concern to
the States. The State of Wisconsin, however ... has chosen to
severely limit the penalties ...." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, n. 14.
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offense, and it should not be considered a minor offense for the
purpose of exigent circumstances analysis.
The fact that evidence was being destroyed or dissipated,
and the fact that this State, as shown in its statutory scheme,
considers DUI a serious offense, both militate toward a finding
of exigency.

This court still must make a fact-specific inquiry

to determine the existence of exigent circumstances; its "task is
to review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the
particular case to determine if the finding of exigency [by the
trial court] was proper."

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah

1987) .
The following circumstances, viewed cumulatively, are
important to determining whether exigency justifies a warrantless
entry.

See People v. Odenweller, 527 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. A.D.

1988).

The officers' entry was made at a reasonable hour of the

day.

The manner of entry was peaceful.

The officers merely

stepped through a door which opened fortuitously as a result of a
knock.

The entry occurred immediately subsequent to what the

City has argued constituted voluntary consent; it was at least a
relatively cordial encounter.

Once inside the apartment the

officers stayed close to the door, not wandering through the
apartment to find the defendant.

Though this was not hot

pursuit, the search for the defendant covered only a matter of
minutes, covering a fairly direct line from the accident scene to
her apartment; such an investigation can be characterized as a
'luke warm7 investigation.

There was a trail of evidence leading
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from the Buick to the apartment door: car door ajar with alcohol
emanating from it; purse on the porch; door closing slowly.

The

officers had probable cause to believe a fleeing and now hiding
defendant had committed not one, but two misdemeanor offenses.
Considered in light of these circumstances, the City
believes its officers acted properly in this case when they
entered without a warrant because they had every reason to
believe the defendant had committed two crimes and because
evidence of one of these crimes, a serious one to which
substantial sanctions attach, was being lost as time passed.

The

need for immediate search was apparent to the officers because of
the unique character of evidence of alcohol intoxication, and,
under these circumstances the need to obtain such evidence
outweighed the defendant's privacy expectations, which had been
substantially diminished when she left her door ajar.

Therefore,

trial court's finding of exigency should be sustained.
Such a ruling would be consistent with rulings from other
jurisdictions.

See State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 1988)

(held that officers' warrantless entry of a hit and run suspect's
home was justified by exigent circumstances, where investigation
was continual and police had probable cause to believe defendant
was intoxicated); People v. Odenweller, 527 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y.
A.D. 1988) (held that warrantless entry was justified by exigent
circumstances where short investigation ensued after hit and run
driver left the scene and where police had strong evidence
defendant had been driving while intoxicated) .
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There is an additional reason this court should sustain the
trial court's finding of exigency.

Any delay in apprehending a

DUI defendant who is in a residence allows that defendant to
consume or claim to have consumed more alcohol during the interim
between being report to law enforcement and apprehension, thus
tainting evidence of intoxication for use at trial and
frustrating law enforcement efforts.
The City emphasizes it is not requesting this court to
formulate a broad rule on this issue, the exigent circumstance
inquiry is fact-specific.

The City's position is that on the

facts of this case, exigent circumstances existed, and the City
requests this court to so hold.

While a contrary holding would

confer substantial rights on DUI defendants, it also would result
in "the diminution of the powers of law enforcement which are
aimed at promoting the public good by the prevention of crime."
State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225 (Conn. 1992) (COVELLO, J.,
dissenting).
DUI is not a minor offense in Utah. It is unique in that
evidence of it is subject to being destroyed through natural
processes of the body.

Since the evidence is contained in the

suspect's body itself, a suspect's body must be secured as soon
as possible after the suspect is detected so the evidence cannot
be tainted by subsequent acts or alleged acts of alcohol
ingestion.

Under the facts and exigencies of this case, the

officers' were justified in immediately apprehending the
defendant.

To do otherwise would have frustrated valid efforts
27

to detect and apprehend a person who created a risk to public
safety.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the City respectfully requests this court to
uphold the trial court's ruling denying the defendant's
suppression motion.
DATED and submitted this October 4, 1993.
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Orem City Prosecutor
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